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Abstract
How to address the link between  environmental  are  regressed on factor endowments  and measures  of
regulation and trade  was an important  part of  environmental  standards  (legislation in force).  The
discussions at the World Trade Organization  Ministerial  results suggest that, if country heterogeneity  such as
in Doha,  Qatar in November 2001.  Trade ministers  enforcement  of environmental  regulations is controlled
agreed to launch  negotiations on trade and the  for,  more stringent environmental  standards imply lower
environment,  specifically  clarification  of WTO rules.  net exports of metal mining,  nonferrous metals, iron,
Wilson,  Otsuki, and Sewadeh address an important  and steel and chemicals.  The authors  find find that a
part  of the background  context for deciding whether or  trade agreement  on a common  environmental standard
how to link trade agreements to the environment from a  will cost a non-OECD country substantially  more than
developing country  perspective.  The authors ask whether  an OECD country.  Developing countries  will, on
environmental  regulations affect  exports of pollution-  average,  reduce  exports of the  five pollution-intensive
intensive or "dirty"  goods in 24 countries between  1994  products by 0.37 percent of GNP. This represents  11
and  1998.  Based  on a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek  (HOV)  percent of annual exports of these products from the 24
model, net exports in five pollution-intensive  industries  studied countries.
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The relationship between environmental standards  and trade is at the forefront of
policy debate. Disputes over linkages between trade and the environment have
intensified over the past decade. The 1999 Seattle Ministerial of the World Trade
Organization  (WTO) ended in failure, at least in part, due to profound differences
over tying environmental performance  to competitiveness  in exports.  The issue of
whether to link trade agreements to environmental  standards was one of the factors
for consideration  at the WTO Ministerial  in November 2001  in Doha, Qatar.  There
are only weak disciplines currently in the WTO agreements  regarding environmental
standards, as reflected in the Marrakech decision on trade and environment. The
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary  Standards both include provisions related to environmental  protection,
however, there have been few formal disputes that were brought to the WTO. The
question remains  whether trade agreements are the best policy tool to affect change in
environmental  policy.'
If lax environmental  standards provide additional incentives for export
competition in pollution-intensive  industries, and if developing countries  do not place
an emphasis  on domestic environmental  quality, then free trade may result in a "race
to the bottom"  in regulation.  Private sector firms may exert pressure on governments
in developed countries to scale back the most stringent environmental  standards.
Alternatively, if developed countries  seek to harmonize environmental  standards
' For a more detailed discussion of these issues see: Global Economic  Prospects and the Developing
Countries 2001,  chapter 3, The World Bank, December 2000.
2globally at increasingly high levels, then developing countries may confront lower
growth rates of exports in pollution-intensive industries.
This paper empirically explores the link between trade and environmental
standards by controlling for human capital as a technological variable.  We also
explicitly include a measure of the degree of enforcement of environmental
regulations in the modeling.  This enforcement mechanism is assumed to have a
distinct role from environmental  legislation in the analysis.
We study major pollution-intensive  industries: metal mining, nonferrous
metals, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and chemicals in 6 OECD and  18 non-OECD
countries over the period 1994 to  1998. The analysis in large part follows the
Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model developed for econometric estimation by
Tobey (1990), using data on environmental stringency from Dasgupta et al.  (2001).
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical
and empirical works on trade and environmental regulation.  Section 3 discusses the
common and distinct characteristics of the pollution-intensive  industries.  Section 4
reviews the existing cross-country measures of the stringency of environmental
regulation. Section 5 presents the data and the analytical framework.  Section 6 reports
the results, and Section 7 analyzes  the results and their implication on trade policy.
2.  Trade and Environmental Regulation
Most studies that trace the link between trade and the stringency of an environmental
standard explore either the industrial flight (pollution-haven)  or industrial
specialization hypothesis.  The industrial flight hypothesis centers on investigating the
3factors that determine  industry location and whether environmental  regulations
influence  foreign direct investment decisions by firms. These studies are largely
concerned with the possibility of flight by pollution-intensive industries and foreign
direct investment (FDI) from developed  to developing countries. The industrial
specialization hypothesis is explored by examining whether lax environmental
standards lead to specialization in pollution-intensive industries by creating greater
accessibility  for industries to air and water resources.
The empirical evidence in the industry flight literature is mixed.  Pearson
(1987), Leonard (1988), Friedman, et al. (1992), and Levinson (1996) found little or
no evidence that environmental  regulations  have a significant impact on the
investment or location decisions of foreign firms. Mani, Pargal and Huq (1997), Gray
(1997), and Wheeler (2000) offer a counter--argument  for this hypothesis.
Levinson (1996) employed firm-level data on location choice and pollution
abatement  costs to assess the effect of state environmental regulations  on new
manufacturing  plant locations in the U.S.  Levinson indicates that the limited
evidence of industry flight stems from firms that have plants in several states
following the most stringent environmental  regulations  in all locations.  Mani, Pargal
and Huq's (1997) study of new plant locations  in India indicate that environmental
spending, presumably occurring as a result of more stringent regulation, is likely to be
higher for more pollution-intensive  industries. Gray (1997) note that firms want to
locate where the markets are and that polluted areas may have shrinking markets,
hence driving some firms away.
4On the contrary,  Lucas et al. (1990) and List and Co (1999) found some
support for the industry-flight hypothesis.  Lucas et al.  suggest that implementation  of
progressively strict environmental  regulations in the OECD countries have led to
significant location displacement of pollution-intensive  industries. List and Co study
show that regulatory expenditures  per manufacturer and the location decision of a
new firm are inversely related in West Virginia.
Smarzynska  and Wei (2001) also find some support for the industry-flight
hypothesis.  They control for corruption levels in a host country and use a firm level
dataset for 25 transition economies to assess support for the industry flight
hypothesis.  Wheeler (2000) provides examples of the link between air pollution
regulation and FDI in Mexico, Brazil, India, and the U.S. that illustrate the
importance of community,  or firm level efforts, to internalize the costs of pollution in
developing countries.
The majority of studies that examine industrial  specialization have found little
or no empirical support (Tobey,  1990; Low and Yeats,  1992; Grossman and Krueger,
1993; Xu,  1999).  Tobey (1990) investigates whether domestic environmental
regulations have an impact on international trade patterns in five pollution-intensive
industries for 23 countries.  He found no statistical significance  of his environmental
regulation measures on the net exports of these industries.  Grossman and Krueger
(1993)  find no evidence that a comparative advantage is being created by lax
environmental  regulations in Mexico. Xu (1999)'s study on bilateral trade found no
evidence that a country with stricter environmental standards lowering their total
exports of pollution-intensive  goods.
5Low and Yeats (1992) found that pollution-intensive  industries  account for a
large and growing share of exports in the total manufacture  of exports in some
developing countries,  and a decreasing share of exports in developed countries
between  1965  and 1988. Grossman and Krueger argue that the difficulty in finding
and supporting statistical evidence for the industrial specialization hypothesis  lies in
the fact that endowments  such as physical and human capital,  and investment remain
dominant in determining a county's trade pattern.
On the contrary, Kalt (1988) finds that environmental  regulations in the U.S.
have led to a sharp reduction in net manufacturing exports in 1977 presumably due to
a shift of output mix toward the production of clean air and water, and away from
pollution-intensive  outputs.  In contrast, Antweiler et al. (1998)  suggests that trade
changes the composition of national output in a more polluting way for capital-
abundant countries. This implies that the developed  countries have comparative
advantage in producing pollution-intensive goods.
3.  Pollution-Intensive  Industries
Various definitions have been used for pollution-intensive  industries in the empirical
literature. Grossman and Krueger (1993) measure environmental  intensity by using
the ratio of pollution abatement  costs to the total amount of value added to a specific
U.S. industry. Low and Yeats (1992), and Xu (1999)  define  pollution-intensive
goods as products of industries that incurred abatement costs in the U.S.  of
approximately  1 percent or more of the total  value of sales in 1988.  This definition
results in four industries: Iron and Steel, Metal Manufactures,  Cement, and
6Agricultural Chemicals.  Smarzynska and Wei (2001)  include in their analysis a set of
pollution-intensive  industries, which range from the low to high level of pollution.
While the Smarzynska and Wei approach appears to be the most general in nature a
certain level of aggregation  is useful when the impact of environmental  standards  is
compared across industries.  Tobey defines pollution-intensive industries, as "those
whose direct and indirect abatement costs in the U.S. are equal to or greater than  1.85
percent of total costs." According to the author,  1.85 percent  is used, because it
results-when  commodities are aggregated-in a set of five industries that are
generally considered the polluting: Metal Mining, Primary Nonferrous  Metals, Pulp
and Paper, Primary Iron and Steel, and Chemicals.
As there appears to be no definitive criteria yet adopted to define pollution
intensive, we follow Tobey's definition of pollution-intensive industries in our
analysis  for comparison purposes. These five industries aggregate three-digit SITC
industries in the following manner:
Metal Mining:  SITC (Revision  1) 281,  283
Primary Nonferrous Metals2:  681, 682,  683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 689
Pulp and Paper: 251, 641, 642
Primary Iron and Steel: 671,  672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678
Chemicals3:  512, 513, 514, 581
2  Tables 2 and 3 contain all of the relevant information about nonferrous  metals.
3 We added the Organic Chemicals  industry to the Chemicals  industry category,  as it is also considered
to be pollution-intensive.
7Information about the pollutant releases presented in the paper is available
from the most recent TRI reporting notebook for the year of 1993. The TRI system
contains data on total toxic emissions during production.  Table 2 provides a
description of the chemicals causing pollution and different pollution prevention
activities,4 while Table 3 provides an overview of the amount of different pollutants
released and transferred  from each industry.
In the TRI notebook,  total toxic emissions are divided into releases  and
transfers. Total releases  are defined as "On-site discharge of a toxic chemical to the
environment."  This includes emissions to the air, discharges to water, and disposal to
land. Transfers are defined as "Transfers of toxic chemicals in wastes to a facility that
is geographically or physically separate from the facility reporting under TRI." The
quantities reported represent a movement of the chemical away from the reporting
facility." Unless the disposal is off-site, these waste products do not necessarily
contribute to pollution.
In 1993, the total amount of releases and transfers of the Pulp and Paper
industry was 218 million pounds of toxic chemicals, whereas the Chemicals industry
released and transferred 2.5 billion pounds that accounted for 33 percent of all
releases and transfers.  Toxic chemical releases  from the pulp and paper facility were
approximately  550,000 pounds, i.e.  five times as much as the mean amount of toxic
chemical releases per facility across all of the industries in the TRI system. Table 3
shows that the maximum amount of pollution released (87 percent) by the Pulp and
4 Information on the Mining industry is derived fiom the Mineral Waste Releases and Environmental
Effects Summaries,  since we do not have TRI reporting available for this industry.
8Paper industry is emitted to the air, followed by approximately  10 percent of as water
discharge.
A total of 438 million pounds of toxic chemicals were released and transferred
by the Organic Chemical industry, representing  18 percent of the total releases and
transfers by the entire chemical industry,  and 6 percent of the releases and transfers
by all the industries under TRI. In comparison, releases and transfers by the Inorganic
Chemical industry totaled 249.7 million pounds in 1993. The Plastics industry
releases were mainly air pollutants.  The Chemicals industry comprises the Organic,
Inorganic and Plastics industries.  Historically, the Chemicals industries surpassed the
other industries in TRI chemical releases.  Emissions to the air, and discharges to
water, are very significant in the Chemicals industry.
The Iron and Steel industry released and transferred a total of approximately
695 million pounds of pollutants containing a large proportion of metal-bearing
wastes. About 70 percent of these wastes are transferred for offsite recycling in order
to recover the metal content that results in increase  in transfers  in this industry.
Waste disposal on land represents a very large proportion from the total releases of
the Iron and Steel industry.  When the transfers of different industries are compared,
the Iron and Steel industry appears to have a very high amount of pollutants relative
to the other industries. Moreover, emissions to the air and discharges to water are
significantly lower than land disposal. The bulk of industrial wastes from the Iron and
Steel industry are recycled.
94.  Measuring Environmental Standards
It is essential to choose a reliable measure of an environmental standard.  List and Co
(1999)  use four different measures of the stringency of environmental  regulation  for
the U.S. The first two measures estimate money spent by different agencies within a
state to control air and water pollution and solid waste disposal.  The third measure
they use is firm-level pollution abatement operating expenditures  relative to abating
air and water pollution and solid waste disposal. The fourth measure  is an index that
combines local, state and federal government pollution abatement efforts with firm-
level abatement  expenditures to assign a dollar-value  ranking to each state. A higher
value in the index implies more stringent environmental  regulations. Tobey (1990) on
the other hand, measures environmental  stringency by using data from a 1976
UNCTAD survey. The degree of environmental  stringency is measured from one to
seven.  Higher values imply more stringent regulations.  Levinson  (1996) includes six
different measures of environmental  stringency in his study. These measures are: (1)
the Conservation  Foundation index that measures each state's "effort to provide a
quality environment  for citizens" (Duerksen,  1983); (2)  the FREE (Fund for
Renewable Energy and the Environment) index, which measures the strength of state
environmental  programs;  (3) the Green index which is an aggregate measure of the
number of statutes that each state has from a list of 50 common environmental  laws;
(4) monitoring employment that measures the states' efforts and abilities in enforcing
statutes; (5)  aggregate abatement costs that show aggregate pollution abatement
operating costs across industries deflated by the number of production workers in the
state in  1982, and finally;  (6) industry abatement costs which measure the amount the
10manufacturers  are required to pay for pollution abatement in each state, provided that
the characteristics  of the manufacturer remain unchanged.  Smarzynska and Wei
(2001) measure environmental  standards by a country's participation in international
treaties (e.g. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution), the quality of
ambient air, water and emission standards, and finally observed actual reduction in
various pollutants.
We use a cross-country  index of the stringency in environmental  regulation
developed by Dasgupta et al. (2001) for our analysis. A higher score in this index
reflects more stringent environmental  standards. The authors randomly selected 31
UNCED reports from a total of 145. These 31  countries range from highly
industrialized, to extremely poor.  Based on these reports, they conducted a survey
that considered the state of policy and performance  in four environmental
dimensions: air, water, land, and living resources. We analyzed the apparent state of
policy as it affects the interactions between these four environmental dimensions and
five activity categories: agriculture,  manufacture,  energy, transport, and the urban
sector. Although many overlaps undoubtedly exist, we attempt to draw a separate
assessment for the interaction of each activity category with each environmental
dimension.
The Dasgupta survey employed 25 questions to categorize  (1) the state of
environmental  awareness,  (2) the scope of legislation enacted, and (3) the control
mechanisms for enviromnental  enforcement in place in each country.  Environmental
awareness in the Dasgupta survey is a measurement of a country's level of public
concern about environmental  quality.  The legislation category of the Dasgupta
11survey measures the extent to which a country's environmental  legislation provides
broad protection of natural resources - such as protection of air, water, land, and
other resources.  A control mechanism for environmental enforcement measures the
ability of regulators to enforce legislation.  It reflects the history of environmental
regulation, existence of regulating institutions and infrastructure,  and power given to
regulating agencies in each country.5
Due to its multi-dimensional property, the elements of this index can be
disaggregated to construct variables that are useful for empirical analysis.  The index
is particularly  useful for treating different aspects of environmental regulation
separately, as they have a distinct, but interactive role in environmental  regulation.
Moreover, the data allow us to disaggregate  the indices into the sectors, so that we
focus only on the industries that are relevant to the analysis, namely manufacturing
industries.
5.  The Econometric  Model
In addition to the choices of reliable measures of an environmental  standard, we
attempt to make an improvement in the econometric model by explicitly
incorporating the key problems that the studies reviewed above had found.  In
summary, they suggest that the effect of environmental  standards on exports is
difficult to statistically observe because: (1) the variation of exports due to
environmental  standards is much subtler than the variation  due to the basic factors of
5 The status in each category  is graded  as high, medium,  or low, with assigned values of 2, 1  and 0,
respectively.  For each  UJNCED country report,  twenty-five questions are answered and total scores are
developed  for each country.
12production, and other traditional  determinants of trade patterns, FDI and location
choice (Tobey,  1990; Low and Yeats,  1992; Dean,  1992; Grossman and Krueger,
1993; and Mani, Pargal and Huq,  1997); (2) omitted variables such as input quality
and technological level make it difficult to obtain a reliable parameter estimate
(Nordstr6m  and Vaughan,  1999); and (3)  differences  in a community or country's
control mechanism for environmental  enforcement may affect the effectiveness  of
environmental regulation (Wheeler,  2000; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001).
The first point does not necessarily imply that the effect of an environmental
standard  is insignificant.  It is rather problematic if  the standard variable is highly
correlated with the other regressors. Using instrumental variables for the standard
variable will mitigate this problem.  The second point will be handled by including
variables that measure the quality of factor endowments, as they are considered to be
one of the important  factors to cause the omitted variable effects.  The third point will
be addressed by explicitly incorporating the structure in which control mechanisms
for environmental  enforcement  interact with an environmental  standard.
We revisit the industrial specialization hypothesis with particular
consideration of the above issues.  Our conceptual model follows the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model, which was first developed by Leamer (1984). As
commonly viewed in the industrial specialization  literature, the environment is treated
as a factor of production that is directly used for agricultural  and industrial production
as an input, or that the environment is degraded through air and water pollution as an
end product of production processes. The Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem, if it is extended
in this context,  suggests that countries  that have lax environmental  standards (thus,
13cnvironmentally  abundant) will, under a free trade regime,  specialize in pollution-
intensive goods.
We follow Tobey's cross-section multifactor HOV model, where multi-
country  data for environmental  standards would fit well. We use the performance
indices of countries in terms of environmental  regulation developed by Dasgupta et
al. (2001). These indices are used to construct two key variables  for environmental
regulation-the  scope of environmental legislation-and  the control mechanism for
environmental  enforcement.
Our analysis employs trade data on pollution-intensive  industries from 24
OECD and non-OECD countries.  The five pollution-intensive  industries presented in
Section 3 are used for our analysis. Net exports and factor endowments  were obtained
for the five-year period between  1994 and  1998.  Following Tobey's HOV model, the
regression model for an individual industry is specified as follows:
= 1+  + /i1capj, 1 + /i2labj,, + /33coa1j, +8oj+  /arlandj,,
(1)
+ /86schlj 1 + 1371eg9j  +/8 8cm  legj, + 89 DoEcDjf .legj 1 + f310cmj 1 +£j,
where the subscriptsj and t denote the country and the year,  Y 1,p  is the value of net
exports  (US$ million)  in countryj in the year t.  The parameter ,6¢  is the estimated
coefficient for the intercept term. The parameters ,I  to  /J0 are the estimated
coefficients  for the explanatory variables.  The term ej,  is the error term, which we
will assume to follow the normality and the zero mean.
14Capital stock (cap), labor (lab), coal (coal), oil (oil), and arable land (arland)
are included, as they measure factor endowments of a country.  Secondary school
enrollment rate (schl) is included in our model, as it measures  labor skills. Since this
variable perhaps is likely to be correlated with quality of other factor endowments
and technological levels, we hope the inclusion of this variable will generally mitigate
omitted variable  effects.
Capital stock (in US$ billions) is computed as an accumulated and discounted
gross domestic investment flow in constant  1995 US dollars  since 1980, assuming an
average life of 15 years, and a constant depreciation rate of 13.3 percent per year.6
Labor (in millions of people) is computed as the number of workers in the labor force
who meet the International Labor Organization  definition of an economically active
population: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services
during a specified period. It includes both the employed and the unemployed.  While
national practices vary in the treatment of such groups as the armed forces and
seasonal or part-time workers, in general, the labor force includes the armed forces,
the unemployed, and first-time job seekers.  Arable land measures the area of arable
land in hectares.  Arable land includes land defined by the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) as land under temporary  crops (double-cropped areas  are
counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or
kitchen gardens,  and land left temporarily  fallow. The value of the production of
primary solid fuel in U.S. dollars is used to measure the endowment of coal.  The
value of oil and gas production in U.S. dollars is used to measure oil endowment.
6 See Maskus (1991) for the discussion on this approach.
15The variable schl follows the definition of the International  Standard
Classification of Education on a net secondary school enrollment ratio. It is the ratio
(in percent) of the number of children at the official school age (as defined by the
national education system) who are enrolled in school, to the population of the
corresponding  official school age.  Secondary education completes the provision of
basic education that began at the primary level, and aims to lay the foundation  for
lifelong learning and human development,  by offering more subject- or skill-oriented
instruction, with more specialized teachers.
Data on capital,  labor, and secondary school enrollment were obtained from
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Data on oil and gas production
(in millions of barrels),  and coal (in millions of short tons) were obtained from the
U.S.  Department of Energy (USDOE) database.
In our model, the state of legislation (leg) is constructed from the Dasgupta et
al. (2001) dataset, and has been used as the measure of an environmental standard.  It
is measured by aggregating the scores on the scope of legislation enacted in the
manufacturing sector (see Table  1 for the total scores on legislation).  Similarly, the
scores on the control mechanism for environmental  enforcement  (cm) are calculated
by aggregating the scores on the control mechanism for environmental  enforcement
for the manufacturing  sector.
As discussed earlier, the effect of legislation may differ according to the state
of the control mechanism  for environmental enforcement.  As modeled in Smarzynska
and Wei (2001), an inclusion of a product term between the legislation and a control
mechanism variable  is intuitive.  The product term allows a slope for the legislation
16variable to vary across countries, particularly between developed and developing
countries.
In addition, unobserved  differences between developed and developing
countries can be controlled by using a slope dummy for developed (or developing)
countries.  We use a dummy variable for OECD membership,  DOECD.  How the state
of a control mechanism for environmental  enforcement,  and the stage of development
will affect the effectiveness of legislation can thus be tested by examining statistical
significance of  68  and  /9,  respectively. The total effect of the state of legislation can
be tested by investigating  the statistical significance  of /,  + 3,B  cm +  89g  for the
OECD countries and  87  + / 8cm  for the non-OECD countries.  Details of this effect
will be explained later in Section 6.
Statistical  independence between the explanatory variables is required for
reliable parameter estimates, but Table 4 indicates possible multi-collinearity  in some
pairs of the variables. It is particularly problematic when key variables from which
policy implication is to be derived are correlated with other explanatory variables.
Notably, leg and cm are highly correlated, which will likely prevent deriving separate
policy implications of each variable, thus, instrumental variables  are used for each of
these variables.  Instrumental variables are chosen such that they are not correlated
with the other instrumental variables, and also with the instruments for that variable.
Data on these instruments are obtained from the Environmental Sustainability Index,
developed jointly by the World Economic Forum's Global Leaders for Tomorrow
Environment Task Force, the Yale Center for Environmental  Law and Policy, and the
Columbia University Center for International  Earth Science Information Network
17(2001), except for the data on a country's total government expenditure, which is
obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (1995-1998).
The instruments  used for legislation are: (1)  the number of memberships in
environmental  intergovernmental  organizations (eionum); (2)  percentage of cites
reporting requirements  met (cites); (3)  levels of ratification under the Vienna
convention  for the protection of the ozone layer (vienna); (4) Montreal protocol
multilateral fund protection (monfun); (5)  the number of ISO  14001  certified
companies per GDP (isol.4); and (6) environmental  strategies and action plans
(plans). The instruments used for the control mechanism variable are (1)  members of
the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources  (IUCN)
(iucn), (2) government expenditure  per capita (gov), and (3)  the number of sectoral
EIA guidelines (eia).7 While the choice of these instrumental variables  is based on
the logical linkage and causal relationship, we also chose them such that they were
not strongly correlated  with other explanatory variables  in Equation (1) and their
counterpart instrumental equation (see T'able 4).
The two instrumental equations are assumed to take a linear form:
legj, =ao + aleionumjB ++  a 2citesj 1 + a3 viennajt
+ a4  monfun j,  + a, isol  4 j,±  + wj.  (2)
cmj 1 =Y  + y,iucnj,  + y2gov 1 ,  + y3eiaj, +  j  (3)
A Non-Linear Two-Stage Least Squares (NL2SLS) method is used to estimate
equation (1) for the five pollution-intensive good exports. NL2SLS method is used
18because a product term makes the model structure non-linear and also to account for
the presence of instrumental variables  in the product term. Kelejian (1991)  offers an
approach that estimates a system of non-linear equations.  He suggests estimating first
the slope parameters equation by equation, then calculating the gradients of these
equations with respect to the slope parameters,  and evaluating them at the estimated
values of these parameters. Then use these gradient vectors as instruments for the
dependent variables.
We have one non-linear equation and two instrumental equations.  Thus, we
have three dependent (or endogenous) variables.  Amemiya (1976) indicates that a
different set of gradients can be used for each equation. This allows  us to have a
rather simple equation system.  We use the original 6 and 3 instrumental variables for
leg and cm, respectively. We also use the explanatory  variables in Equation (1) as
instruments for nex. This makes Equations (1), (2)  and (3) unchanged.  But it is
necessary to include an additional equation that has the product termn, leg cm, as the
instrumental variable.  It is because this term is also a gradient, and consists of two
dependent (or endogenous) variables. We use all 9 of the instrumental variables for
leg and cm, and the product terrns that pair each of the 6 instrumental variables for leg
and each of the 3 instrumental variables for cm, as they logically  follow.  The
instrumental equations for leg, cm and the product term, are fitted in the first stage.
In the second stage, Equation (1)  is estimated by replacing the corresponding
variables with these fitted values. In this stage, we corrected for heteroscedasticity  in
7 While the use of these instrumental variables follow  a logical order, a necessary assumption is made
that the instrumental variables are unchanged  over time.
19Equation (1) by weighting the observations by the square root of the OLS estimated
variances  from the individual country.8
6.  Results
The results are reported in Table 5. Capital is found to be significant for all of the five
industries with a negative effect for the Mining and Nonferrous Metals industries and
positive effect for the Pulp and Paper, Iron and Steel and Chemicals industries. Labor
is positive and significant for the Chemicals industry, but it is insignificant for the
Nonferrous Metal industry, and significantly negative for the Mining, Pulp and Paper
and Iron and Steel industries. The coefficient estimate for coal is found to be positive
and marginally significant for the Nonferrous Metals and Iron and Steel industries,
while it is significantly negative for the Metal Mining industry. The effect of coal in
the Pulp and Paper and Chemicals  industries  is insignificant.  Arable land has a
significant  effect in all of the industries, with varying signs across industries.  Oil is
significant  for the Mining and Chemicals industries,  with a positive effect in the
Mining industry, and a negative effect in the Chemicals industry.  Oil is insignificant
in the other three industries (Nonferrous  Metals, Pulp and Paper, and Iron and Steel).
Labor skills, as measured by the variable school, appear to have a positive significant
relationship with net exports for all the industries, except for the Pulp and Paper
industries, where it is insignificant. Negative  coefficient estimates for the factor
endowment variables, in some cases, are difficult to explain by real world
observations.  It is perhaps due to the high correlation among these variables.
8  See Amemiya (1985) for the detail of this method.
20Table 6 reports the results of a joint significant test of the effect of the state of
legislation on net exports. The terms  A7  +  /38 cm + fig  for the OECD countries and
67  + 48cm  for non-OECD are found to be negative and significant in all industries,
except for the Pulp and Paper industry in non-OECD countries. The results regarding
the legislation variable generally support the industrial specialization  hypothesis.
More stringent environmental  standards imply less net exports of pollution-intensive
industries. This negative relationship  is revealed once the control mechanism  for
environmental enforcement  and the unobserved heterogeneous  factors across
countries  are taken into account.
The total effect of legislation is, however,  significantly different between
OECD and non-OECD countries. As Table 5 shows, the estimated coefficient for  8,3
is significant and negative in all cases. This means that environmental  legislation has
a more dramatic effect on net exports in OECD countries  than in non-OECD
countries. The role of a control mechanism for environmental  enforcement  in
influencing the marginal effect of legislation on net exports is, however, not evident.
The estimated coefficient  for the product term between leg and cm is
insignificant in all industries. Unlike our prior expectation,  the effect of legislation
does not systematically vary with the control mechanism measure.  Nevertheless,  it is
perhaps still useful to include this product term as a control variable in order to
improve the estimate for the joint term fl, + /8cm +  /3g.  The direct effect of the
control mechanisms  on net exports measured by,8 10 is positive and significant in the
Mining, Nonferrous Metals and Chemical industries, while it is insignificant  for the
Pulp and Paper and Iron and Steel industries.  The results regarding the control
21mechanism variable generally differ from the prior expectation. If the results are
considered to reflect the true underlying relationship, the insignificant sign on the
product term may reflect that the effectiveniess  of legislation may be enhanced more
significantly by factors other than control mechanisms for environmental
enforcement.  The positive sign on the single term may reflect the fact that improved
control mechanisms for environmental  enforcement  imply better compliance ability
of the country to the environmental  standards of its exporting partners.
7.  Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
What do these findings suggest in regard to trade policy and multilateral disciplines
on environmental protection?  Our analysis suggests that environmental regulation can
affect export competition.  The negative relationship between the stringency of
environmental  standards and exports in the majority of industries examined may
imply a possible trade-off between  two goals-trade expansion  and encouraging
improvements in environmental  standards.  If developing  countries do not place an
emphasis on environmental  quality, they are reluctant to tighten environmental
standards.  This could then result in a so-called "race-to-the-bottom"  as with lack of
international  coordination pollution may become more concentrated in the developing
countries.
If developed countries,  instead,  seek to harmonize environmental  standards
globally at high levels, through trade agreements, then developing countries may
suffer from a greater loss in exports of the pollution-intensive products than a
developed country.  For example,  suppose that all of the countries in our sample
22harmonize environmental  standards at the most stringent level (Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands,  and Switzerland).  Based on our estimated slope parameters,  a non-
OECD country will, on average, reduce  exports of the five pollution-intensive
products by US$ 2.6 million each year, or 0.37 percent of the average  GNP of the
non-OECD countries  in our study.  This represents  11 percent of annual exports of
these products  from the 24 studied countries.  In contrast, an OECD country,  on
average, will reduce annual exports by US$ 0.62 million, or 0.0 19 percent of the
average GNP of the OECD countries in our study.  This is 2.5 percent of annual
exports of these products from the 24 studied countries.
This illustrates that global harmonization of environmental  standards reduce
developing country exports of pollution-intensive goods more than exports from
developed countries.  Our findings suggest tighten environmental  standards  in
developing countries gradually with transition periods could avoid rapid decline in
net exports of pollution-intensive products.  It is also important to raise public
environmental awareness  in developing countries  so that the loss of export
competitiveness  in these products are placed within the context of improved
environmental benefits.
The implications of our analysis are more complex, but remain relevant, for
questions of trans-boundary pollution that form the core agenda of the new WTO
negotiations.  The results do indicate a relationship between standards and trade.
Developed countries are motivated to set a high global environmental  standard in
multilateral environmental  agreements,  as they tend to benefit more from reductions
in trans-boundary pollution produced outside their borders.  Some of the pollution
23generated by the industries studies here do cross national borders.  International
coordination to offset loss in export competitiveness  shown here should be part of
discussion at the WTO.  Moreover, the targeting principle that suggests that
addressing pollution emissions at the source through taxes and other direct domestic
policy instruments-rather  than through trade sanctions  or limits on imports of goods
by trading partners-remains  the more rational policy prescription to suggest in this
area, rather than embedding new obligations  in trade agreements at the WTO.
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27Table 1.  Scores for the State of Legislation  (Max=24)
OECD country  Non-OECD country
Finland  21  Bangladesh  9
Germany  24  Brazil  14
Ireland  24  Bulgaria  23
Korea  22  China  17
Netherlands  24  Egypt, Arab Rep.  11








South Africa  19
Thailand  10
Trinidad and Tobago  13
Tunisia  21
Zambia  12Table 2.  Major Pollutants and Pollution Prevention Activities
Major chemicals contributing to  Major pollution prevention activities  Pollution abatement
pollution  costs as percentage of
total costs
Metal  Mining  Chlorine,  Arsenic, Cadmium.  Flotation, leaching,  tailing, metal parts cleaning, blasting and  1.92-2.03
crushing.
Nonferrous Metal  Chlorine, Copper compounds, Zinc  Process equipment modification, raw materials substitution or  2.05
compounds,  Lead compounds, and  elimination,
Sulfuric acid.  solvent recycling, precious metals  recovery.
Pulp and Paper  Methanol, Hydrochloric  acid, Sulfuric  Extended delignification,  enzyme treatment of pulp, chlorine  2.40
acid, Chloroform.  dioxide substitution,  improved chipping and screening, improved
chemical controls and mixing.
Iron and Steel  Hydrochloric  acid, Ammonia, Zinc  Reducing cokemaking emissions, reducing wastewater volume.  2.38
compounds.
Inorganic Chemical  Hydrochloric  acid, Chromium,  Substitution of raw materials, improve reactor efficiencies  and  2.89
Carbonyl Sulfide, Ammonia.  catalyst, improve wastewater treatment and recycling.
Plastics  Trichloroethane,  Acetone,  Carbon  Overall process to control for waste water,  disposal and pellet  2.36
disulfide.  release.
Organic  Chemical  Sulfuric acid, Methanol and  Overall process to control for catalysts, raw materials e.t.c.  1.53-2.89
tert-butyl alcohol.
Source: U.S. EPA (1995)  and Tobey (1990).Table 3.  Annual Releases  and Transfers for Pollution-Intensive  Industries in 1993
Releases (in thousand pounds)  Transfers
Industry  Air Pollutant  Water Pollutant  Land Disposal  Total Releases  Total Transfers
Metal Mining  Not available
Nonferrous  79,861  5,862  91,868  177,591  33,580
Metal  (45%)  (3.3%)  (51.7%)
Pulp and Paper  148,272  17,666  3,727  169,665  48,416
(87.4%)  (10.4%)  (2.2%)
Iron and Steel  21,552  18,479  45,767  85,798  609,540
(25.1%)  (21.5%)  (53.4%)
Inorganic  25,104  123,474  31,064  179,642  70,046
Chemical  (14%)  (69%)  (17%)  ,  _
Plastics  117,702  308  394  118,404  45,044
(99.4%)  (0.26%)  (0.34%)
Organic  61,000  88,450  2,400  151,850  135,700
Chemical  (40.2%)  (58.2%)  (1.6%)  __  _
TRI  industry  93%  1%  6%
average
Source: U.S. Environmental  Protection Agency (1995).Table 4.  Correlation Coefficient  Matrix
Explanatory variables  Instruments
cap  lab  arland  schl  coal  oil  leg  cm  eionum  cites  vienna  monfun  isol4  plans  iucn  gov  eia
cap  1.00
lab  0.11  1.00
arland  0.11  0.98  1.00
schl  0.33  -0.17  -0.14  1.00
coal  0.52  0.68  0.68  0.17  1.00
oil  0.13  0.50  0.58  -0.02  0.29  1.00
leg  0.36  -0.11  -0.09  0.76  0.19  -0.20  1.00
cm  0.50  -0.13  -0.13  0.73  0.21  -0.20  0.86  1.00
eionum  0.57  0.22  0.23  0.64  0.33  0.32  0.53  0.73  1.00
cites  0.31  0.22  0.20  0.10  0.38  -0.22  0.18  0.24  0.21  1.00
vienna  0.29  -0.37  -0.37  0.39  -0.23  0.03  0.41  0.30  0.32  -0.07  1.00
monfun  -0.06  -0.23  -0.20  0.27  -0.06  -0.08  0.39  0.25  0.00  -0.24  0.38  1.00
isol4  0.02  -0.04  -0.03  0.06  -0.08  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.15  0.19  -0.04  -0.06  1.00
plans  -0.08  0.31  0.30  0.14  0.25  0.22  0.08  0.23  0.45  0.10  -0.14  -0.17  -0.22  1.00
iucn  -0.19  -0.37  -0.34  0.27  -0.25  -0.37  0.45  0.49  0.11  -0.03  0.16  0.18  0.04  0.23  1.00
gov  0.50  -0,17  -0.17  0.59  0.08  -0.16  0.67  0.93  0.79  0.26  0.28  0.13  0.17  0.30  0.44  1.00
eia  0.07  0.47  0.46  0.09  0.51  0.50  -0.07  0.09  0.43  0.06  -0.26  -0.07  0.35  0.48  -0.21  0.18  1.00Table 5.  Coefficient  Estimates for 5 Pollution-Intensive  Goods'  Net Exports (Non-linear  2SLS)
Metal Mining  NFMetals  Pulp&Paper  Iron&Steel  Chemicals
Intercept  -1004.63***  -1211.35***  -824.21  -795.73  -7296.56***
(170.68)  (287.06)  (724.05)  (935.18)  (1689.84)
Capital  -0.39***  -0.12*  0.47*  1.48***  2.96***
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.46)
Labor  -29.78***  0.75  -14.88***  -23.6***  49.29***
(1.62)  (1.34)  (2.53)  (4.79)  (7.71)
Coal  -1.14***  0.49*  0.60  2.53*  1.78
(0.42)  (0.28)  (0.65)  (1.44)  (2.22)
Oil  1.76***  0.09  -0.46  1.3  -3.28***
(0.26)  (0.18)  (0.33)  (0.87)  (0.83)
Land  80.27***  -7.61**  33.61***  51.39***  -137.15***
(3.95)  (3.2)  (6.62)  (12.2)  (17.46)
School  8.86***  5.26***  -0.82  12.91***  32.58***
___________  (1.7)  (1.68)  (1L52)  (4.55)  (7.59)
Legislation  -87.08***  -31.48**  6.18  -104.65*  -74.21*
(9.04)  (12.67)  (15.86)  (39.04)  (42.00)
DOECD  *Legislation  -76.22***  -61.3***  -39.17*  -72.34*  -200.81***
(7.47)  (11.03)  (20.72)  (42.61)  (64.83)
Legislation*Control  Mechanism  -0.02  -0.03  -0.26  -0.02  0.31
(0.13)  (0.04)  (0.25)  (0.11)  (0.29)
Control Mechanism  51.42***  37.87***  -24.26  37.12  165.77***
(5.13)  (8.25)  (19.85)  (29.06)  (41.75)
Time dummy for 1995  -77.78  -42.9  -26.17  -103.4  -0.31
(51.03)  (31.93)  (70.83)  (94.3)  (130.14)
Time dummy for  1996  -45.59  -25.00  -21.6  -61.00  -84.4
(48.5)  (36.75)  (71.68)  (117.08)  (138.16)
Time dummy for  1997  -92.94*  -39.26  -2.94  -7.76  -83.31
(51.08)  (37.07)  (71.9)  (119.47)  (140.64)
Time durnmy for  1998  -77.98  -37.29  35.22  -37.1  -198.25
(52.45)  (38.02)  (72.05)  (132.81)  (191.62)
Number of obs  77  93  111  97  97
Log-likelihood  -500.65  -594.38  -804.41  -745.32  -790.85
Note: Inside parentheses  are standard errors.  Notations "*", ""*"and  "***" signify significance  at the
10, 5 and I  percent levels based on a two-tailed test, respectively.Table 6.  Joint Hypothesis Testing on the Effect of Legislation
___  M_  etal Mining  NFMetals  Pulp&Paper  Iron&Steel  Chemicals
OECD countries  _  _  _
E(07+ 09+E(cm)*  38)  -164.09  -93.93  -44.40  -177.81  -261.5
SE(,87+  9+E(cm)*  8)  15.03  20.48  24.15  70.05  88.4
Assym. t value  -10.92  -4.59  -1.84  -2.54  -2.9
Statistical significance  1/  10/  50/  10/  10/
Non-OECD countries_  __  _  _  _
E(07+E(cm)*  8)  -87.87  -32.63  -5.23  -105.4  -60.7
SE(0l7+E(cm)*  0s)  11.85  12.12  10.13  38.3  47.1
Assym. t value  -7.4  -2.6  -0.5  -2.75  -1.2
Statistical significance  10/  10/  ns  10/  100/
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